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Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
 
This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
 
Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
 
British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
 
John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
 
Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
 
Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
 
Causes of the War
 
A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
 
Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
 
Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
 
Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
 
Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
 
The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
 
A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
 
Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
 
U.S. Political Direction
 
After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
 
Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
 
The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
 
Koreans on the War
 
Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
 
Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
 
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
 
Military Allies, Political Doubters
 
The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
 
The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
 
The Armed Forces
 
The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
 
The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
 
The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
 
The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
 
The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
 
Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
 
Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
 
Logistics and Coalition Warfare
 
Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
 
The Allies
 
The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
 
At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
 
Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
 
The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
 
Special Operations
 
The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
 
Russia and the War
 
From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
 
Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
 
Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
 
China and the War
 
The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
 
The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
 
One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
 
Aftermath
 
Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
 
The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
 
—Allan R. Millett
 
Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee

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  • History
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  • Testimonials
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  • Contact Us
  • [#printed] => 1 ) [#sorted] => 1 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => menu_tree__main_menu [1] => block ) [#contextual_links] => Array ( [menu] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/menu/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => main-menu ) ) [block] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/block/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => system [1] => main-menu ) ) ) [#block] => stdClass Object ( [bid] => 95 [module] => system [delta] => main-menu [theme] => kw60_inq [status] => 1 [weight] => -55 [region] => header [custom] => 0 [visibility] => 0 [pages] => [title] => [cache] => -1 [subject] => ) [#weight] => 1 [#children] => [#printed] => 1 ) [#sorted] => 1 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => region ) [#region] => header [#printed] => 1 [#children] => ) [sidebar_first] => Array ( [block_17] => Array ( [#markup] => Events News Services Contact Us [#contextual_links] => Array ( [block] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/block/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => block [1] => 17 ) ) ) [#block] => stdClass Object ( [bid] => 502 [module] => block [delta] => 17 [theme] => kw60_inq [status] => 1 [weight] => -1 [region] => sidebar_first [custom] => 0 [visibility] => 0 [pages] => [title] => [cache] => -1 [subject] => ) [#weight] => 1 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => block ) [#type] => markup [#pre_render] => Array ( [0] => drupal_pre_render_markup [1] => ctools_dependent_pre_render ) [#children] => [#printed] => 1 ) [block_3] => Array ( [#markup] => [#contextual_links] => Array ( [block] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/block/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => block [1] => 3 ) ) ) [#block] => stdClass Object ( [bid] => 100 [module] => block [delta] => 3 [theme] => kw60_inq [status] => 1 [weight] => 0 [region] => sidebar_first [custom] => 0 [visibility] => 0 [pages] => [title] => [cache] => -1 [subject] => ) [#weight] => 2 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => block ) [#type] => markup [#pre_render] => Array ( [0] => drupal_pre_render_markup [1] => ctools_dependent_pre_render ) [#children] => [#printed] => 1 ) [#sorted] => 1 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => region ) [#region] => sidebar_first [#printed] => 1 [#children] => ) [sidebar_second] => Array ( [block_19] => Array ( [#markup] => Support Oral Histories Certificate Links [#contextual_links] => Array ( [block] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/block/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => block [1] => 19 ) ) ) [#block] => stdClass Object ( [bid] => 508 [module] => block [delta] => 19 [theme] => kw60_inq [status] => 1 [weight] => -52 [region] => sidebar_second [custom] => 0 [visibility] => 0 [pages] => [title] => [cache] => -1 [subject] => ) [#weight] => 1 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => block ) [#type] => markup [#pre_render] => Array ( [0] => drupal_pre_render_markup [1] => ctools_dependent_pre_render ) [#children] => [#printed] => 1 ) [block_2] => Array ( [#markup] => [#contextual_links] => Array ( [block] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/block/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => block [1] => 2 ) ) ) [#block] => stdClass Object ( [bid] => 97 [module] => block [delta] => 2 [theme] => kw60_inq [status] => 1 [weight] => -39 [region] => sidebar_second [custom] => 0 [visibility] => 0 [pages] => [title] => [cache] => -1 [subject] => ) [#weight] => 2 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => block ) [#type] => markup [#pre_render] => Array ( [0] => drupal_pre_render_markup [1] => ctools_dependent_pre_render ) [#children] => [#printed] => 1 ) [#sorted] => 1 [#theme_wrappers] => Array ( [0] => region ) [#region] => sidebar_second [#printed] => 1 [#children] => ) [sidebar_first_right] => Array ( [views_home_events_new-block_1] => Array ( [#markup] => [#contextual_links] => Array ( [views_ui] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/views/view [1] => Array ( [0] => home_events_new ) ) [block] => Array ( [0] => admin/structure/block/manage [1] => Array ( [0] => views [1] => home_events_new-block_1 ) ) ) [#views_contextual_links_info] => Array ( [views_ui] => Array ( [location] => block [view] => view Object ( [db_table] => views_view [base_table] => node [base_field] => nid [name] => home_events_new [vid] => 23 [description] => [tag] => default [human_name] => Home Events New [core] => 7 [api_version] => [disabled] => [editing] => [args] => Array ( ) [use_ajax] => [current_page] => [items_per_page] => [offset] => [total_rows] => [exposed_raw_input] => Array ( ) [old_view] => Array ( ) [parent_views] => Array ( ) [is_attachment] => [display] => Array ( [default] => views_display Object ( [display_options] => Array ( [query] => Array ( [type] => views_query [options] => Array ( ) ) [access] => Array ( [type] => perm [perm] => access content ) [cache] => Array ( [type] => none ) [exposed_form] => Array ( [type] => basic ) [pager] => Array ( [type] => none [options] => Array ( [offset] => 0 ) ) [style_plugin] => default [row_plugin] => node [fields] => Array ( [title] => Array ( [id] => title [table] => node [field] => title [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [exclude] => 0 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 0 [text] => [make_link] => 0 [path] => [absolute] => 0 [external] => 0 [replace_spaces] => 0 [path_case] => none [trim_whitespace] => 0 [alt] => [rel] => [link_class] => [prefix] => [suffix] => [target] => [nl2br] => 0 [max_length] => [word_boundary] => 0 [ellipsis] => 0 [strip_tags] => 0 [trim] => 0 [preserve_tags] => [html] => 0 ) [element_type] => 0 [element_class] => [element_label_type] => 0 [element_label_class] => [element_label_colon] => [element_wrapper_type] => 0 [element_wrapper_class] => [element_default_classes] => 0 [empty] => [hide_empty] => 0 [empty_zero] => 0 [hide_alter_empty] => 1 [link_to_node] => 1 ) [body] => Array ( [id] => body [table] => field_data_body [field] => body [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [exclude] => 0 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 0 [text] => [make_link] => 0 [path] => [absolute] => 0 [external] => 0 [replace_spaces] => 0 [path_case] => none [trim_whitespace] => 0 [alt] => [rel] => [link_class] => [prefix] => [suffix] => [target] => [nl2br] => 0 [max_length] => 120 [word_boundary] => 1 [ellipsis] => 1 [strip_tags] => 1 [trim] => 1 [preserve_tags] => [html] => 0 ) [element_type] => 0 [element_class] => [element_label_type] => 0 [element_label_class] => [element_label_colon] => [element_wrapper_type] => 0 [element_wrapper_class] => [element_default_classes] => 0 [empty] => [hide_empty] => 0 [empty_zero] => 0 [hide_alter_empty] => 1 [click_sort_column] => value [type] => text_default [settings] => Array ( [trim_length] => 600 ) [group_column] => value [group_columns] => Array ( ) [group_rows] => 1 [delta_limit] => all [delta_offset] => 0 [delta_reversed] => [delta_first_last] => [multi_type] => separator [separator] => , [field_api_classes] => 0 ) [field_ev_start_end] => Array ( [id] => field_ev_start_end [table] => field_data_field_ev_start_end [field] => field_ev_start_end [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [exclude] => 0 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 0 [text] => [make_link] => 0 [path] => [absolute] => 0 [external] => 0 [replace_spaces] => 0 [path_case] => none [trim_whitespace] => 0 [alt] => [rel] => [link_class] => [prefix] => [suffix] => [target] => [nl2br] => 0 [max_length] => [word_boundary] => 1 [ellipsis] => 1 [strip_tags] => 0 [trim] => 0 [preserve_tags] => [html] => 0 ) [element_type] => [element_class] => [element_label_type] => [element_label_class] => [element_label_colon] => [element_wrapper_type] => [element_wrapper_class] => [element_default_classes] => 1 [empty] => [hide_empty] => 0 [empty_zero] => 0 [hide_alter_empty] => 1 [click_sort_column] => value [type] => date_default [settings] => Array ( [format_type] => events [fromto] => both [multiple_number] => [multiple_from] => [multiple_to] => ) [group_column] => value [group_columns] => Array ( ) [group_rows] => 1 [delta_limit] => all [delta_offset] => 0 [delta_reversed] => [delta_first_last] => [multi_type] => separator [separator] => , [field_api_classes] => 0 ) [address] => Array ( [id] => address [table] => location [field] => address [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => Location: [exclude] => 0 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 0 [text] => [make_link] => 0 [path] => [absolute] => 0 [external] => 0 [replace_spaces] => 0 [path_case] => none [trim_whitespace] => 0 [alt] => [rel] => [link_class] => [prefix] => [suffix] => [target] => [nl2br] => 0 [max_length] => [word_boundary] => 1 [ellipsis] => 1 [strip_tags] => 0 [trim] => 0 [preserve_tags] => [html] => 0 ) [element_type] => 0 [element_class] => [element_label_type] => [element_label_class] => [element_label_colon] => 0 [element_wrapper_type] => 0 [element_wrapper_class] => [element_default_classes] => 1 [empty] => [hide_empty] => 0 [empty_zero] => 0 [hide_alter_empty] => 1 [hide] => Array ( [name] => 0 [street] => 0 [additional] => 0 [city] => 0 [province] => 0 [postal_code] => 0 [country] => 0 [locpick] => 0 [province_name] => 0 [country_name] => 0 [map_link] => 0 [coords] => 0 ) ) ) [filters] => Array ( [status] => Array ( [value] => 1 [table] => node [field] => status [id] => status [expose] => Array ( [operator] => ) [group] => 1 ) [type] => Array ( [id] => type [table] => node [field] => type [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [operator] => in [value] => Array ( [webform] => webform ) [group] => 1 [exposed] => [expose] => Array ( [operator_id] => [label] => [description] => [use_operator] => 0 [operator] => [identifier] => [required] => 0 [remember] => 0 [multiple] => 0 [remember_roles] => Array ( [2] => 2 ) [reduce] => ) [is_grouped] => [group_info] => Array ( [label] => [description] => [identifier] => [optional] => 1 [widget] => select [multiple] => [remember] => 0 [default_group] => All [default_group_multiple] => Array ( ) [group_items] => Array ( ) ) ) [field_event_type_value] => Array ( [id] => field_event_type_value [table] => field_data_field_event_type [field] => field_event_type_value [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [operator] => in [value] => Array ( [yes] => yes ) [group] => 1 [exposed] => [expose] => Array ( [operator_id] => [label] => [use_operator] => 0 [operator] => [identifier] => [required] => 0 [remember] => 0 [multiple] => 0 [reduce] => ) ) ) [sorts] => Array ( [field_ev_start_end_value] => Array ( [id] => field_ev_start_end_value [table] => field_data_field_ev_start_end [field] => field_ev_start_end_value [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [order] => ASC [exposed] => [expose] => Array ( [label] => ) ) ) [title] => events [row_options] => Array ( [relationship] => none [view_mode] => full [links] => 1 [comments] => 0 ) [style_options] => Array ( [row_class] => ) [header] => Array ( [area] => Array ( [id] => area [table] => views [field] => area [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [empty] => 1 [content] =>

    Upcoming Events

    [format] => full_html [tokenize] => 0 ) ) [empty] => Array ( [area] => Array ( [id] => area [table] => views [field] => area [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [empty] => 0 [content] => There are currently no events to display. [format] => filtered_html [tokenize] => 0 ) ) [use_ajax] => [footer] => Array ( [area] => Array ( [id] => area [table] => views [field] => area [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [empty] => 1 [content] => See All Events [format] => php_code [tokenize] => 0 ) ) ) [db_table] => views_display [vid] => 23 [id] => default [display_title] => Master [display_plugin] => default [position] => 1 ) [block_1] => views_display Object ( [display_options] => Array ( [query] => Array ( [type] => views_query [options] => Array ( ) ) [defaults] => Array ( [title] => 1 [filters] => 1 [filter_groups] => 1 [fields] => [style_plugin] => [style_options] => [row_plugin] => [row_options] => [header] => [empty] => 1 [pager] => [pager_options] => [sorts] => [footer] => ) [style_plugin] => default [style_options] => Array ( [row_class] => ) [row_plugin] => fields [row_options] => Array ( [default_field_elements] => 1 [inline] => Array ( ) [separator] => [hide_empty] => 0 ) [header] => Array ( ) [fields] => Array ( [field_short_date_pr] => Array ( [id] => field_short_date_pr [table] => field_data_field_short_date_pr [field] => field_short_date_pr [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [exclude] => 0 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 0 [text] => [make_link] => 0 [path] => [absolute] => 0 [external] => 0 [replace_spaces] => 0 [path_case] => none [trim_whitespace] => 0 [alt] => [rel] => [link_class] => [prefix] => [suffix] => [target] => [nl2br] => 0 [max_length] => [word_boundary] => 1 [ellipsis] => 1 [strip_tags] => 0 [trim] => 0 [preserve_tags] => [html] => 0 ) [element_type] => [element_class] => [element_label_type] => [element_label_class] => [element_label_colon] => [element_wrapper_type] => [element_wrapper_class] => [element_default_classes] => 1 [empty] => [hide_empty] => 0 [empty_zero] => 0 [hide_alter_empty] => 1 [click_sort_column] => value [type] => text_default [settings] => Array ( ) [group_column] => value [group_columns] => Array ( ) [group_rows] => 1 [delta_limit] => all [delta_offset] => 0 [delta_reversed] => [delta_first_last] => [multi_type] => separator [separator] => , [field_api_classes] => 0 ) [title] => Array ( [id] => title [table] => node [field] => title [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [exclude] => 0 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 0 [text] => [make_link] => 0 [path] => [absolute] => 0 [external] => 0 [replace_spaces] => 0 [path_case] => none [trim_whitespace] => 0 [alt] => [rel] => [link_class] => [prefix] => [suffix] => [target] => [nl2br] => 0 [max_length] => 55 [word_boundary] => 1 [ellipsis] => 1 [more_link] => 0 [more_link_text] => [more_link_path] => [strip_tags] => 0 [trim] => 1 [preserve_tags] => [html] => 0 ) [element_type] => [element_class] => [element_label_type] => [element_label_class] => [element_label_colon] => [element_wrapper_type] => [element_wrapper_class] => [element_default_classes] => 1 [empty] => [hide_empty] => 0 [empty_zero] => 0 [hide_alter_empty] => 1 [link_to_node] => 1 ) [field_ev_start_end] => Array ( [id] => field_ev_start_end [table] => field_data_field_ev_start_end [field] => field_ev_start_end [relationship] => none [group_type] => group [ui_name] => [label] => [exclude] => 1 [alter] => Array ( [alter_text] => 1 [text] => [field_ev_start_end]

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    CHEPACHET, R.I.--(BUSINESS WIRE)-- Some of Rhode Island’s Korean War...
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.
     
    The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 1, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, Canada's Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's New Zealand and the Korean War, vol. 1, Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, Combat Operations (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953 (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
     
    Special Operations
     
    The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).
     
    Russia and the War
     
    From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby —a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.
     
    Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).
     
    Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950—12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).
     
    China and the War
     
    The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
     
    The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter, 1998/1999).
     
    One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history, Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated—at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-1951, see Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.
     
    Aftermath
     
    Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). The Journal of American—East Asian Relations 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors — especially the Asians — offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.
     
    The publishing event of the 50th anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Han'guk Ch<1>njaeng-sa (1966-1977) in six volumes. The Korean War, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than an abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the Korean War is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
     
    —Allan R. Millett
     
    Reprinted with permission of ABC-Clio Press and edited by the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commoration Committee
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    Photo Caption:  Pictured are just a few of the works on the Korean War.
     
    This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is reproduced and revised with the permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum and the Society for Military History.
     
    Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the communists is less appealing. In his book, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory.
     
    British authors have written significant books: David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck Jr., The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
     
    John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).
     
    Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945 (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., Korea and the Cold War (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).
     
    Causes of the War
     
    A civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Choson dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and 35 years of misery.
     
    Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea: Old and New (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, Korea—A History (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).
     
    Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations that survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyongju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung and Shannon McCune, eds., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).
     
    Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
     
    Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.
     
    The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).
     
    A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concludes that P'yongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.
     
    Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411—431, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," Journal of American—East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 73—98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon Landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, The Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.
     
    U.S. Political Direction
     
    After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental president, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-1956), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989); and Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
     
    Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson are Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's Acheson: the Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
     
    Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984) and Harold J. Noble, Embassy at War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in The Foreign Relations of the United States, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
     
    The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24—30 (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.
     
    Koreans on the War
     
    Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention; remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention; deep sadness over the consequences of the war; pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans; a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere; and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, The Korean War and International Law (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, The History of the Korean War (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).
     
    Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea — more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight for Korea (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963) and Kim Se-Jin, The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
     
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) and Suh Dae-Sook, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.
     
    Military Allies, Political Doubters
     
    The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism and incompetence in the ROK Army officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-1953 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Son-Yop, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yop, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chong Il-Kwon, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
     
    The American military of 1950-1953, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, The Martyred (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, The Three Day Promise (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," Military Affairs 38 (April 1974): 53—58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953 (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.
     
    The Armed Forces
     
    The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense"series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 3, The Korean War (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.
     
    The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987); Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); and Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet (New York: Morrow, 1953) or Pork Chop Hill (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffee-table variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).
     
    The official Marine Corps history is Lynn Montross et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-1972), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).
     
    The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations Korea (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank Manson, Battle Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).
     
    The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing and close-air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
     
    Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects.
     
    Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959 (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army Reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).
     
    Logistics and Coalition Warfare
     
    Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, The Medic's War (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.
     
    The Allies
     
    The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, The Korean War and the United Nations (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).
     
    At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from 14 countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.
     
    Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1